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Abstract
We study the problem of the emergence of cooperation in the spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma.
The pioneering work by Nowak and May (1992) showed that large initial populations of
cooperators can survive and sustain cooperation in a square lattice with imitate-the-best
evolutionary dynamics. We revisit this problem in a cost-benefit formulation suitable for
a number of biological applications. We show that if a fixed-amount reward is established
for cooperators to share, a single cooperator can invade a population of defectors and form
structures that are resilient to re-invasion even if the reward mechanism is turned off. We
discuss analytically the case of the invasion by a single cooperator and present agent-based
simulations for small initial fractions of cooperators. Large cooperation levels, in the sus-
tainability range, are found. In the conclusions we discuss possible applications of this
model as well as its connections with other mechanisms proposed to promote the emer-
gence of cooperation.
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1 Introduction
The emergence of cooperative behavior among unrelated individuals is one of
the most prominent unsolved problems of current research (Pennisi, 2005). While
such non-kin cooperation is evident in human societies (Hammerstein, 2003), it
is by no means exclusive of them, and can be observed in many different species
(Doebeli and Hauert, 2005) down to the level of microorganisms (Velicer, 2003;
Wingreen and Levin, 2006). This conundrum can be suitably formulated in terms of
evolutionary game theory (Maynard-Smith, 1982; Gintis, 2000; Nowak and Sigmund,
2004; Nowak, 2006) by studying games that are stylized versions of social dilem-
mas (Kollock, 1998), e.g., situations in which individually reasonable behavior
leads to a situation in which everyone is worse off than they might have been other-
wise. Paradigmatic examples of these dilemmas are the provision of public goods
(Samuelson, 1954), the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968), and the Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD) (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). The first two of them involve multi-
ple actors, while the latter involves only two actors, this last case being the setting
of choice for a majority of models on the evolution of cooperation.
The PD embodies a stringent form of social dilemma, namely a situation in which
individuals can benefit from mutual cooperation but they can do even better by
exploiting cooperation of others. To be specific, the two players in the PD can adopt
either one of two strategies: cooperate (C) or defect (D). Cooperation results in a
benefit b to the opposing player, but incurs a cost c to the cooperator (where b >
c > 0). Defection has no costs and produces no benefits. Therefore, if the opponent
plays C, a player gets the payoff b−c if she also plays C, but she can do even better
and get b if she plays D. On the other hand, if the opponent plays D, a player gets
the lowest payoff −c if she plays C, and it gets 0 if she also defects. In either case,
it is better for both players to play D, in spite of the fact that mutual cooperation
would yield higher benefits for them, hence the dilemma.
Conflicting situations that can be described by the PD, either at the level of indi-
viduals or at the level of populations are ubiquitous. Thus, Turner and Chao (1999)
showed that interactions between RNA phages co-infecting bacteria are governed
by a PD. Escherichia coli stationary phase GASP mutants in starved cultures are
another example of this dilemma (Vulic´ and Kolter, 2001). A PD also arises when
different yeasts compete by switching from respiration to respirofermentation when
resources are limited (Frick and Schuster, 2003). Hermaphroditic fish that alter-
nately release sperm and eggs end up involved in a PD with cheaters that release
only sperm with less metabolic effort (Dugatkin and Mesterton-Gibbons, 1996). A
recent study of cooperative territorial defence in lions (Panthera leo), described
the correct ranking structure for a PD (Legge, 1996). And, of course, the PD ap-
plies to very many different situations of interactions between human individuals
or collectives (Axelrod, 1984; Camerer, 2003).
2
In view of its wide applicability, the PD is a suitable context to pose the ques-
tion of the emergence of cooperation. How do cooperative individuals or popula-
tions survive or even thrive in the context of a PD, where defecting is the only
evolutionarily stable strategy (Maynard-Smith, 1982; Nowak, 2006)? Several an-
swers to this puzzle have been put forward (Nowak, 2006) among which the most
relevant examples are kin selection theory (Hamilton, 1964), reciprocal altruism
or direct reciprocity (Trivers, 1971; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981), indirect reci-
procity (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998), emergence of cooperation through punish-
ment (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002) or the existence of a spatial or social structure of
interactions (Nowak and May, 1992). This last approach has received a great deal
of attention in the last decade and has proven a source of important insights into the
evolution of cooperation (see Szabo´ and Fa´th (2007) for a recent and comprehen-
sive review). One such insight is the fact that cooperators can outcompete defectors
by forming clusters where they help each other. This result, in turn, leaves open the
question of the emergence of cooperation in a population with a majority of defec-
tors. Recently, it has been shown (Ohtsuki et al., 2006) that, if the average number
of connections in the interaction network is k, the condition b/c > k implies that se-
lection favors cooperators invading defectors in the weak selection limit, i.e., when
the contribution of the game to the fitness of the individual is very small. However,
a general result valid for any intensity of the selection is still lacking.
In this paper, we propose a new mechanism for the emergence of cooperation,
which we call shared reward. In this setting, players interact through a standard
PD, but in a second stage cooperators receive an additional payoff coming from
a resource available only to them and not to defectors. It should be emphasized
that similar reward mechanisms may be relevant for a number of specific appli-
cations, such as mutualistic situations with selection imposed by hosts rewarding
cooperation or punishing less cooperative behavior (see, e.g., Kiers et al. (2003)
and references therein). Another context that may be modelled by our approach
is team formation in animal societies (Anderson and Franks, 2001), e.g., in coop-
erative hunting (Packer and Ruttan, 1988). On the other hand, the idea of a shared
reward could be implemented in practice as a way to promote cooperation in human
groups or, alternatively, may arise from costly signaling prior to the game, when the
exchange of cooperative signals among cooperators is free (Skyrms, 2004). As we
will see, this scheme makes it possible for a single cooperator to invade a popula-
tion of defectors. Furthermore, when strategies evolve by unconditional imitation
(Nowak and May, 1992), cooperation persists after the additional resource has been
exhausted or turned off. We present evidence for these conclusions coming from
numerical simulations on a regular network. In the conclusion, we discuss the rea-
son for this surprising result and the relation of our proposal to previous work on
evolutionary games on graphs and to public goods games.
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2 Spatial Prisoner’s dilemma with shared reward
Our model is defined by a two-stage game on a network. In the first stage, players
interact with their neighbors and gobtained payoffs as prescribed by the PD game,
whose payoff matrix in a cost-benefit context is given by
C D
C
D

 b− c
b
−c
0

 . (1)
Subsequently, in the second stage of the game, a fixed amount ρ is distributed
among all cooperators. It is important to realize at this point that such a two-stage
game is only interesting in a population setting: in a two-player game, the second
stage would amount to shift the cooperator’s payoff by ρ/2 or ρ, depending on the
opponent’s strategy. Then, for ρ < c we would simply have another PD, whereas
for 2c > ρ > c we would have the Hawk-Dove or Snowdrift game (Maynard-Smith,
1982), and for ρ> 2c we would have the trivial Harmony game (also called Byprod-
uct Mutualism (Dugatkin et al., 1992; Connor, 1995). In a population setting, the
amount received by a cooperator depends on the number of cooperators in the total
population and is therefore subject to evolution as the population itself changes.
In order to write down the payoffs for the game after the second stage, we need to
introduce some notation. Let us consider a population of N players, each of whom
plays the game against k other players. For player i, 1≤ i ≤ N, let us denote by Vi
the number of cooperators among the opponents of i, and by Nc the total number of
cooperators in the population. The payoffs can then be written as follows:
Pi =


Vib− kc+
ρ
Nc
, if i cooperates
Vib, if i defects.
(2)
This mechanism to reward cooperation has been studied by Cuesta et al. (2007) in
a game theoretical model of n players with no spatial structure. As stated above, our
goal here is to understand whether or not the mechanism of the shared reward can
explain the emergence of cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma on networks. To
address this problem, we will consider below this game in the framework of a spa-
tial setup following the same general lines as Nowak and May (1992) for compari-
son. We place N individuals on a square lattice with periodic boundary conditions,
each of whom cooperates or defects with her neighbors (4, von Neumann neighbor-
hood). We have chosen this neighborhood for the sake of simplicity in the calcula-
tion; results for Moore neighborhood [used, e.g., by Nowak and May (1992)] can
be obtained in a straightforward manner. After receiveing their payoffs according
to (2), all individuals update their strategy synchronously for the next round, by
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imitate-the-best (also called unconditional imitation) dynamics: they look in their
neighborhood for players whose payoff is higher than their own. If there is any,
the player adopts the strategy that led to the highest payoff among them (randomly
chosen in case of a tie). We then repeat the process and let the simulation run until
the density of cooperators in the lattice reaches an asymptotic average value or else
it becomes 0 or 1 (note that these two states, corresponding to full defection and full
cooperation, are absorbing states of the dynamics because there are not mutations).
From the work by Nowak and May (1992), we know that if we begin the simula-
tion with a sufficiently large cooperator density, then the lattice helps sustain the
cooperation level by allowing cooperators interacting with cooperators in cluster
to survive and avoid invasion by defectors; defectors thrive in the boundaries be-
tween cooperator clusters. What we are interested in is in the question as to how the
large initial cooperator level required by Nowak and May (1992) may arise; if the
initial number of cooperators is small, they cannot form clusters and full defection
is finally established. On the other hand, another relevant point is resilience, i.e.,
the resistance of the cooperator cluster to re-invasion by defectors. In this respect,
we note that while the clusters obtained by Nowak and May (1992) did show re-
silience, their corresponding cooperation level was not large. As we will see below,
the mechanism we are proposing will lead to higher cooperation levels with good
resilience properties, even for medium costs. To address these issues, we begin by
discussing the invasion by a single cooperator placed on the center of the lattice
(in fact, on any site, as the periodic boundary conditions make all sites equiva-
lent). This, along with the possible scenarios of invasion by a single defector, will
lead to a classification of the different regimes in terms of the cost parameter. Sub-
sequently, we will carry out simulations with a very low initial concentration of
cooperators.
3 Invasion by a single cooperator and resilience of cooperation
As our strategy update rule is unconditional imitation, the process is fully deter-
ministic, so we can compute analytically the evolution of the process. Thus, for
the first cooperator, seeded at time t = 0, to transform her defector neighbors into
new cooperators, it is immediate to see that ρ > b+4c; otherwise, the cooperator
is changed into a defector and the evolution ends. If the condition is satisfied, the
four neighbors become cooperators, and we have now a rhomb centered on the site
of the initial cooperator. In what follows, we discuss the generic situation in the
subsequent evolution of the system.
After the initial cooperator has given rise to a rhomb, there will always be four
types of players in the system:
• The cooperators in the bulk, that interact with another four cooperators.
5
• The cooperators in the boundary, defined as the set of cooperators that have links
with defectors. These boundary players have two cooperator neighbors or only
one if they are at the corners of the rhomb, but the key point is that they are
always connected to a cooperator that interacts only with cooperators.
• The defectors in the boundary, that interact with one (opposite to the corners of
the rhomb) or two cooperators.
• The defectors in the bulk, that interact with another four defectors.
For the rhomb to grow two conditions must be met: first of all, the payoff obtained
by the boundary cooperators at the corner (b− 4c plus the reward contribution)
has to be larger than that of the boundary defectors with only one cooperator (b);
secondly, the payoff obtained by cooperators that have two cooperator neighbors
(2b− 4c plus the reward contribution) has to be larger than that of the boundary
defectors that interact with two cooperators (2b). If both conditions are verified,
defectors are forced to become cooperators by imitation. Therefore, we must have
b−4c+ ρ
Nc(t)
> b and 2b−4c+ ρ
Nc(t)
> 2b ⇐⇒ ρ
Nc(t)
> 4c. (3)
We thus find that the condition for invasion does not depend on the benefit b. In
addition, it predicts that invasion proceeds until the rhomb contains too many co-
operators so that the condition is not fulfilled anymore. In view of this result, we
find it convenient to introduce a parameter to measure the reward in terms of the
cost:
δ≡ ρ
4cN
. (4)
With this notation, the prediction for the invasion by a single cooperator is that
it will proceed as long as the fraction of cooperators verifies Nc(t)/N ≤ δ. Nc(t),
the number of cooperators at time t, can be easily determined from the recurrence
relation for the growing rhomb: in case the cooperators increase, a new boundary
layer is added to the rhomb, and we have Nc(t) = Nc(t − 1) + 4t, which can be
immediately solved (with initial condition Nc(0) = 1) to give Nc(t) = 2t2 + 2t +
1. Inserting this result in the above condition allows to determine the maximum
growth time for the cluster, that is t∗ = max{t : 2t2+2t +1≤ δN}, and the fraction
of cooperators in the steady state:
Nc(t∗)
N
. (5)
So far, we have seen that when the reward is large enough (ρ > 4cN), full cooper-
ation sets in, whereas for smaller reward, a cooperator cluster grows up to a final
size that depends on δ. Interestingly, when b/2 > c, the reward mechanism is only
needed to establish an initial population of cooperators, i.e., the rhomb is resilient.
To show this, notice that boundary cooperators observe the defectors that earn the
largest payoff (those with two links to two cooperators) and compare it with the
payoff obtained by bulk cooperators; boundary cooperators are linked to both and
unconditional imitation will lead them to adopt the strategy of the neighbor with
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Fig. 1. Final stage of the invasion of a cooperator population by a single defector, for the
medium cost case b/4 < c < b/2. Defectors are white, cooperators are black.
the largest payoff. The condition for the cooperators to resist re-invasion is then
4(b− c)> 2b ⇐⇒ c < b
2
. (6)
Indeed, if after a number of time steps we turn off the reward, the rhomb structure
arising from the evolutionary process cannot be re-invaded by defectors, as can be
seen from Eq. (6). In the opposite case, c > b/2, the reward must be kept at all
times to stabilize the cooperator cluster.
In order to study the resilience of clusters of cooperators, we consider the simplest
case of invasion by a single defector in the Prisoner’s Dilemma (without reward).
It can be easily shown that this leads to three different cost regimes (Jime´nez et al.,
2007):
• Low cost case, c < b/4: the defector is only able to invade its 4 neighbors, giving
rise to a 5 defector rhomb.
• Medium cost case, b/4 < c < b/2: a structure with the shape of a cross with
sawtooth boundaries is formed, implying a finite density of defectors in the final
state (cf. Fig. 1).
• High cost case, c > b/2: the system is fully invaded by the defector, and cooper-
ators go extinct.
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4 Simulations with an initial concentration of defectors
After considering the case of the invasion of a defecting population by a single
cooperator, we now proceed to a more general situation in which there appear a
number of cooperators randomly distributed on the lattice. To this end, we have
carried out simulations on square lattices of size N = 100× 100 for different ini-
tial numbers of cooperators as a function of the cost parameter (we take b = 1 for
reference) and the reward. A single simulation consists of running the game until
a steady state is reached, as shown by the fraction of cooperators becoming ap-
proximately constant. Generally speaking, the steady state is reached in some 100
games per player. For every choice of parameters, we compute an average over 100
realizations of the initial distribution of the cooperators. Results are shown in Fig.
2 for low, medium and high costs.
Figure 2 shows a number of remarkable features. To begin with, the case of invation
by a single cooperator reproduces the analytical result (5), On the other hand, in all
three plots we see that if instead of a single cooperator we have an initial density
of cooperators, the resulting level of cooperation is quite higher, particularly when
costs are low. Indeed, by looking at panel a), for which c = 0.2 (b = 1), we see
that with a 10% of initial cooperators cooperation sets in even without reward, as
observed by Nowak and May (1992). Notwithstanding, a more remarkable result
is the fact that with an initial density of cooperators as low as 0.1% we find large
cooperation levels for small rewards, for all values of costs. Clearly, the coopera-
tion level decreases with increasing cost, but even for high costs [panel c), c = 0.7],
the cooperation level is significantly higher than the single cooperator one. In this
last case, we also observe that the final state becomes practically independent of
the density of initial cooperators. Finally, an intriguing result is that in the low cost
case, the observed cooperation fraction is not a monotonically increasing function
of the reward: As it can be seen from the plot, for moderate and particularly for
large initial densities of cooperators, increasing the reward may lead to lower levels
of cooperation. The reason for this phenomenon is that, if the reward increases, the
cooperator clusters arising from the cooperator invaders grow larger and overlap.
Therefore, clusters with rugged boundaries are formed, allowing for defectors with
three cooperators which may then be able to reinvade. Further increments of the
reward restore the cooperation levels because then even these special defectors are
overrode. The important consequence is that one cannot assume that, for any situ-
ation, increasing the reward leads to an increasing of the cooperation, i.e., one has
to be careful in designing the reward for each specific application.
The other relevant issue to address in the simulations is the resilience of the attained
cooperation levels. Figure 2 summarizes our results in this regard. Both for low
and high rewards, we confirm the result for the single cooperator invasion that
cooperation disappears if the reward is turned off when the costs are high (c =
0.7 > b/2). For moderate and low costs, the structures arising from the evolution
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Fig. 2. Average fraction of cooperators in the steady state as a function of the rescaled
reward δ = ρ/4Nc, obtained starting with 1 (+), 10 (∗), 100 (◦), and 1000 (⋄) initial coop-
erators. a) low cost, c = 0.2; b) medium cost, c = 0.4; c), high cost, c = 0.7.
with reward do show resilience, at least to some degree. Interestingly, the case of
low reward [panel a)] gives rise to extremely robust cooperation levels, whereas
higher rewards [panel b)] lead to structures for which cooperation decreases when
the reward is absent (medium cost case). This result is connected with the one
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Fig. 3. Time evolution of the fraction of cooperators for the cases of low (dot-dashed line,
c = 0.2), medium (solid line, c = 0.4) and high (dashed line, c = 0.7) costs, for simulations
starting with 100 initial cooperators (density, 1%) randomly distributed. Shown are the
cases of a) low (δ = 0.1) and b) high (δ = 0.5) rewards. Reward is set in place until t = 100
and turned off afterwards.
a) b)
Fig. 4. System snapshots at the stationary state of a single realization of the evolution
(before switching off the reward, see Fig. 3) for the low reward case (δ = 0.1). The initial
density of cooperators is 1%. a) low cost (c = 0.2), b) medium cost (c = 0.4). Defectors are
white, cooperators are black.
already discussed that the cooperation level may not be monotonics in the reward,
and makes it clear that structures originating from a very agressive, high reward
policy may be less resilient than those built with low rewards.
Further insight on the cluster structure arising from the invasion process fueled
by the reward can be gained from Figs. 4 and 5. Figure 4 shows the stationary
structure of the cooperator clusters for the low reward case (δ= 0.1). As we are now
considering that the initial configuration contains a 1% of cooperators randomly
distributed, the shapes are irregular, and some rhombs are larger than others because
they merge during evolution. In accordance with Fig. 3, in the low cost situation the
cooperation level reached is much larger than in the medium cost case. However,
both structures are resilient and survive unchanged if the reward is removed. This
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a) b)
Fig. 5. System snapshots at the stationary state of a single realization of the evolution, a)
before and b) after switching off the reward, see Fig. 3) for the high reward case (δ = 0.5)
and medium cost (c = 0.4). Defectors are white, cooperators are black.
is due to the fact that, as discussed above, in that case defectors can never invade
a cooperating population. The final structure for the high cost case is similar to
Fig. 4b), but in this case suppression of the reward leads to an immediate invasion
by defectors until they occupy the whole system. When the reward is larger, the
situation is somewhat different, as can be appreciated from Fig. 5. While for low
cost we again obtain resilient structures that are preserved even without reward, in
the medium cost regime the patterns change. Panel a) shows the stationary state
reached with the reward; when the reward is taken away, the state changes and
evolves to the configuration shown in panel b). What is taking place here is that due
to the high reward, a cooperation level close to 1 is reached, most of the defectors
being isolated or along lines. When the reward is switched off, these defectors
are in a position to rip much payoff from their interactions with the cooperators,
allowing for a partial reinvasion. Therefore, the final cooperation level has more or
less halved. We stress that even then the cooperation level that remains after the
suppression of the reward is rather large (about 60%), another hint of the efficiency
of this mechanism to promote cooperation.
5 Discussion and conclusions
We have proposed a mechanism that allows a population of cooperators to grow
and reach sizeable proportions in the spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma in a cost-benefit
framework. This mechanism is based in the distribution of a fixed-amount reward
among all cooperators at every time step. With this contribution to the payoffs of the
standard Prisoner’s Dilemma, even a single cooperator is able to invade a fully de-
fecting population. The resulting cooperator fraction is determined by the amount
of the reward as compared to the total number of players and to the cost of the in-
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teraction. Furthermore, for low and medium costs (c < b/2) cooperation is resilient
in the sense that if at some time step the reward is suppressed, the cooperator clus-
ter cannot be re-invaded by the defectors. Finally, we have seen that low rewards
are capable to induce a very large cooperation level, so the mechanism works even
when it changes only a little the payoffs of the Prisoner’s dilemma.
The result we have obtained is relevant, in the first place, as a necessary com-
plement of the original work by Nowak and May (1992) within the cost-benefit
context. In their work they showed that the spatial structure allowed cooperator
clusters to survive and resist invasion by defectors, but they began with a large
population of cooperators. Our work provides a putative explanation as to where
this population comes from. We note that in the original work by Nowak and May
(1992) they observed that the cooperation level decreased with respect to the initial
population, so a mechanism leading to the appearance of high cooperator levels is
certainly needed. In this regard, we want to stress that the reward mechanism gives
rise to structures with very good resilience properties: Simulations without the re-
ward show that starting from a randomly distributed population of cooperators with
very large density (∼ 90%), the final cooperation level is halved for low costs, and
practically disappears for moderate costs.
We stress that, to our knowledge, this is the first time that a mechanism based on
a fixed-amount reward to be shared among cooperators is proposed. Notwithstand-
ing, there are other proposals which are somewhat related to ours, most promi-
nent among them being those by Lugo and Jime´nez (2006) and Hauert (2006).
Lugo and Jime´nez (2006) introduce a tax mechanism in which everybody in the
population contributes towards a pool that is subsequently distributed among the
cooperators. This is different from the present proposal in so far as the contribution
from the tax is not a fixed quantity but rather it increases with the average payoff.
On the other hand, Hauert (2006) focuses on the effects of nonlinear discounts (or
synergistic enhancement) depending on the number of cooperators in the groups of
interacting individuals. Although the corresponding game theoretical model, dis-
cussed by Hauert et al. (2006) belongs to the same general class of n-player games
of our shared reward model, the spatial implementation of the two models is very
different. Thus, in Hauert (2006), payoffs for a given individual depend on the
number of cooperators in her neighborhood, whereas in the present work payoffs
depend on the total number of cooperators in the network. On the other hand, our
interest is also different, in so far as we are discussing a mechanism to foster the ap-
pearance of an initial, sizeable population of cooperators which can later be stable
without this additional resource. It is important to stress that with our mechanism
a large level of cooperation can be established and (in the appropriate parameter
range) stabilized.
We believe that our results may be relevant for a number of experimental situa-
tions where the Prisoner’s Dilemma has been shown to appear in nature. Thus, the
stabilization of mutualistic symbioses by rewards or sanctions as observed in, e.g.,
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legume-rhizobium mutualism (Kiers et al., 2003) is related to the mechanism we
are proposing here: It is observed that soybeans penalize rhizobia that fail to fix
N2 in their root nodules. This decreases the defector’s payoff which is similar to
increasing the cooperator’s payoff by a reward. On the other hand, a description
of the interaction between different strains of microorganisms [see Crespi (2001);
Velicer (2003) and references therein] in terms of this reward mechanism instead
of the standard Prisoner’s Dilemma may prove more accurate and closer to the ac-
tual interaction process. An example could be the evolution of cooperators with
reduced sensitivity to defectors in the RNA Phage Φ6 (Turner and Chao, 1999,
2003). Cooperative foraging is another context where the mechanism of rewarding
cooperation may be relevant, ranging from microorganisms such as Myxococcus
xanthus (Dworkin, 1996) through beetles (Berryman et al., 1985) to wolves or lions
Anderson and Franks (2001). Finally, the question arises as to the validity of such
a mechanism to promote cooperation within humans, as individual players can not
predict in advance the additional payoff they will obtain from the reward, and there-
fore it is not clear whether it would have an influence on them or not. Evidences
from cooperative hunting in humans (Alvard, 2001; Alvard2, 2003) show that high
levels of sharing help sustain cooperative behavior. However, in the human case,
contexts where the reward would be more explicitly included in a manner transpar-
ent to the players are possible and amenable to experiments. Research along these
lines is necessary to assess the possible role of the reward mechanism in specific
situations.
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